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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to Congress' recent agenda, oenophiles' throughout the country
are up in arms about the possible threat to their beloved wine. Wine lovers
and other alcohol enthusiasts face the very real fear that access to their
favorite products may soon be heavily restricted. This is in large part
attributed to the fact that House Resolution 1161 would effectively change
the ways in which states regulate alcohol shipment. The possible
implications of this bill range from the forced shutdown of many wineries
and distilleries due to lack of funding, to the smaller effects of regulation
such as the inability of customers to order wine and other alcohol over the
internet. This bill would also destroy the ability of many to join money-
saving wine clubs. H.R. 1161 and other similar legislation, often referred
to collectively as direct shipping laws, effectively mandate discussion
concerning the shipment of alcohol, the regulatory place of the states in the
scheme of alcohol distribution, the impact on individual consumers, and the
industry's perspective as a whole. Direct shipping laws affect more than
those in the wine industry; rather, they impact the entire economy.
These direct shipping laws exclusively apply to alcohol largely
because of the alleged unique and special place that alcohol holds within
the scheme of interstate commerce.2 Alcohol holds such a hallowed place
within the realm of commerce because of the existence of the Twenty-first
Amendment. 3 The fact that the Twenty-first Amendment specifically states
that transportation of alcohol in violation of state law is illegal4 means that
alcohol occupies a unique place in terms of the reach of the Commerce
Clause. The basic premise "of the Twenty-first Amendment is to create an
exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause with regard to a
specific item of commerce - intoxicating liquors - and by virtue of the
plain language . .. the states are totally unconfined by traditional
Commerce Clause limitations when they restrict the importation of
intoxicating liquors .. . within their borders."'
1. "Oenophile" is defined as "a lover or connoisseur of wine." See Oenophile,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oenophile (2012).
2. Robert L. Jones III, Constitutional Law - Direct Shipment of Alcohol - Well-
Aged and Finally Uncorked: The Supreme Court Decides Whether the Twenty-First
Amendment Grants States the Power to Avoid the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005), 28 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 483, 483
(2006).
3. See Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Interplay between Twenty-First Amendment and
Commerce Clause concerning state regulation of intoxicating liquors, 116 A.L.R.5th
149, §2[a] (2004).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §2.
5. Lauzon, supra note 3, at §2[a].
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While many aspects of the issue of direct wine shipping are
encapsulated within the overall topic, this paper focuses on the implications
that occur when direct shipment of wine from a manufacturer is sought by
an individual consumer. The laws that are implicated within this
discussion include the Twenty-first Amendment, the Commerce Clause,
state laws, and judge-made law in the form of various United States
Supreme Court opinions. Direct alcohol shipment laws have many forms
and vary widely from state to state. Prior to 2005, many states allowed in-
state direct shipment, but disallowed shipment from other states to their
citizens.6
In Granholm v. Heald, the United States Supreme Court required that
this type of discriminatory practice be stopped in holding that it is
unconstitutional for states to discriminate in interstate commerce by
favoring in-state wineries over out-of-state wineries for direct shipping
purposes.7 However, the Granholm ruling only went so far. While the
dicta in the opinion touched on the three-tiered system, which will be
discussed later in Part IV, the essential part of the holding was a broad anti-
discrimination policy.8  The Court struck down the practices that were
blatantly discriminatory against other states, but also said that if the
practices were viewed as even-handed, then their continuation was
permitted.9 However, in light of recent developments at the Congressional
level, state bans on direct shipment may again become stricter and more
abundant.
This paper discusses the newest potential threat to the direct shipment
of wine, presently known as House Resolution 1161, the Comprehensive
Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness (CARE) Act of 2011,10 and its nearly
identical predecessor, House Resolution 5034 of 2010." This paper will
outline many topics surrounding the direct shipment of wine, the
constitutional battle surrounding these laws, the potential effects on
6. See generally Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (discussing the laws of
New York and Michigan).
7. Id. at 493.
8. See Kevin C. Quigley, Uncorking Granholm: Extending the Nondiscrimination
Principle to all Interstate Commerce in Wine, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1871,1895-96 (2011)
(citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489, 465-66, 487-89 (The Court made the following
statements concerning its holding about anti-discriminatory policies: "discrimination is
neither authorized nor permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment," "state regulation of
alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause," and
"[d]iscrimination is contrary to the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-
first Amendment.")).
9. See Granholm at 493.
10. H.R. 1161, 112th Cong. (2011).
11. H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. (2010).
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businesses and individuals throughout the nation dealing in wine and other
alcohol, and the current debate in Congress. Part II overviews the alcohol
and wine industry within the United States. Part III lays the foundation for
the legal debate currently being discussed in Congress. Both the
constitutional and judicial arguments of the implications of wine shipping
are discussed as well. Part IV overviews H.R. 1161 and its predecessor,
including their development, various stakeholders' arguments, and the
overall impact of the bills. Part V analyzes the bills within the context of
the constitutional and judicial issues, along with the social and political
landscape of today's world. This paper concludes by recommending the
proper place in society for wine regulation and offering an analysis of the
implications, effects, and dangers that may result from the passage of H.R.
1161.
II. THE WINE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES
In order to understand and develop the intricacies of the constitutional
and judicial concerns underlying the CARE Act, the wine industry as a
whole within the United States must first be discussed. The commerce of
the wine industryl2 and its permeation throughout the country is a key issue
in fully understanding the possible effects and ramifications of the bill.
A. The Wine Industry -An Overview
Wine is considered to be "truly an economic catalyst with tremendous
growth potential in all 50 states" since wineries not only work to "revitalize
and support local economies in rural communities," but also generate
tourism and other activities that impact the rest of the country. Individual
states have numerous powers to regulate wine and other alcoholic
beverages and tend to do so quite heavy-handedly. The states possess such
authority because of the unique character of alcohol, as specified by the
Twenty-first Amendment, and because of the significant sums of money
that can be generated from its sale. Many onerous regulations are present
concerning the sale of alcohol, and thus the issue of states' autonomy and
12. Wine industry and alcohol industry are used interchangeably throughout this
paper and are intended to have the same meaning.
13. Ivy Brooke Erin Grey, Good Spirits or Sour Grapes?: Reaching a Tax
Compromise for Direct-To-Consumer Wine Sellers under Quill, the 21st Amendment,
and the Dormant Commerce Clause in Light of Granholm v. Heald, 8 Hous. Bus. &
TAX L.J. 142, 148 (2007) (citing Press Release, National Study of Economic Impact of
U.S. Wine Industry: Grapes and Grape Products Contribute $162 Billion to Economy,
WINE BUSINESS (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.winebusiness.com/news/
dailynewsarticle.cfm?datald=4623).
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authority concerning the matter needs to be reviewed in light of the
potential Congressional enactments.
The grape and grape products industry, of which wine is an integral
part, is worth approximately $162 billion.14 Wineries are present, ranging
in type and size, in all fifty states.15 The annual sales revenue of wine
production totals approximately $11.4 billion. 6 The wine industry is ever-
growing and continuously expanding throughout the country. In 2007, the
total shipment of wine both to and within the United States from all types
of production sources, increased at a rate of 4% over the previous year to a
total of 745 million gallons of wine for a retail total of $30 billion." The
U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that of the entire composition of
the wine in the United States, California wine makes up 61% of all wine
sold in the United States market; imported, or foreign, wine is responsible
for 26% of the market share; and the remaining 13% of the share is
comprised of the wineries of other states within the United States.' With
these percentages showing that a very unequal distribution of wine among
the states in terms of production exists, it can be seen why this issue is so
pervasive in discourse today.
Additionally, it was estimated in 2005 that over 3,000 wineries were
present within the country and that this number had expanded three-fold in
the course of the previous 30 years.' 9 However, the number of wholesalers
has decreased from approximately 1,600 to 600, which also decreased the
ratio of wholesalers to small wineries. 20 Even though the total number of
wineries has increased overall, the concentration of wine wholesalers and
retailers has led to a severe consolidation of production, resulting in the
industry becoming characterized by a relatively few number of large
producers.2 1 Therefore, many wineries are forced to rely heavily on direct
14. Press Release, National Study of Economic Impact of U.S. Wine Industry:
Grapes and Grape Products Contribute $162 Billion to Economy, WINE BUSINESS (Jan.
17, 2007), available at http://www.winebusiness.com/news/dailynewsarticle.cfm?
datald=46237.
15. Gina M. Riekhof and Michael E. Sykuta, Regulating Wine by Mail, 27
REGULATION 30 (Fall 2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv27
n3/v27n3-3.pdf.
16. Press Release, National Study of Economic Impact of U.S. Wine Industry:
Grapes and Grape Products Contribute $162 Billion to Economy, WINE BUSINESS (Jan.
17, 2007), available at http://www.winebusiness.com/news/dailynewsarticle.cfm?
datald=46237.
17. Donald A Hodgen, U.S. Wine Industry 2008, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ADMINISTRATION (June 20, 2008) www.ita.doc.gov/td/ocg/wine2008.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Granholm at 467.
20. Id. (citing Riekhof and Sykuta, supra note 15, at 31).
21. See Riekhof and Sykuta, supra note 15, at 31.
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shipment to individual customers across the country and internationally for
reaching new markets and customer bases when wholesalers do not select
their brand for sale.22
B. Wine Shipping in the United States
Currently, 12 states completely ban out-of-state direct wine shipping
and 38 states have either limited direct shipping or permit the allowance of
limited shipments; presently, no state practices reciprocity.23 The states
that completely prohibit the direct shipment of wine within their borders
include: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, and Utah.24 Prohibited states completely ban shipment while those
allowing limited shipments vary in their enforcement procedures and
policies. 25 The concept of reciprocity arose from a 1986 California law that
prohibited the direct shipment of wine from other states to California unless
the other state allowed California to ship to their residents as well. 26
Reciprocity allows states to enter into agreements for wine shipping in
which they recognize a two-way shipping privilege.27 In the years leading
up to the Supreme Court's landmark Granholm decision, there were more
states that allowed some form of direct shipping than those that prohibited
it.28
22. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 467. "Picking up" a brand refers to carrying a brand at a
liquor store or for distribution for sale. See also Gordon Eng, Old Whine in a New
Battle: Pragmatic Approaches to Balancing the Twenty-First Amendment, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and the Direct Shipping of Wine, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1849,
1881 (2003).
23. State Shipping Laws, WINE INSTITUTE, http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant.com/
Home.aspx? Sale TypelD=1 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
24. See Who Ships Where, WINE INSTITUTE, http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant.com/
WhoShipsWhere.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
25. See id.
26. See Riekhof & Sykuta, supra note 15, at 30.
27. See State Shipping Laws FAQs, WINE INSTITUTE, http://www.wineinstitute.org
/initiatives/stateshippinglaws/faqs#10 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). Additionally, "[i]n
its simplest form, a reciprocal law says 'a winery in your state can ship to a consumer
in my state, only if a winery in my state can ship to a consumer in your state."' Id
28. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2005) (The Court cites that prior to
its decision "[a]pproximately 26 States allow some direct shipping of wine, with
various restrictions. Thirteen of these States have reciprocity laws, which allow the
direct shipment from wineries outside the State, provided the State of origin affords
similar nondiscriminatory treatment (footnotes omitted). In many parts of the county,
however, state laws that prohibit or severely restrict direct shipments deprive
consumers of access to the direct market.").
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In Granholm, the Court held that state regulations disallowing certain
wine shipping practices while allowing similar practices, for in-state
producers were unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause for
being overly discriminatory. 29 Since the Granholm holding, it has been
deemed unlawful for any in-state winery to ship directly within the state
when an out-of-state winery is subject to different wine shipping
regulations. 3 0 While Granholm deals with the anti-discriminatory nature of
laws regarding wine shipping and importation, direct wine shipping is the
heart of this paper. The regulatory control over all aspects of shipping
concerns the direct shipment of wine. Because alcohol regulations are
considerably stringent in comparison to other products, it has been said that
the states can "control alcohol in ways that it cannot control cheese."
C. What is Direct Shipping?
Direct shipping bans limit the shipment of alcohol directly to an
individual customer's residence. These laws "restrict the shipment of
alcoholic beverages directly from out-of-state producers and retailers to in-
state customers."3 2 Their existence in many states dates back to the time of
the repeal of Prohibition. 33  The limitation inherent to this ban is placed
upon the customer, stores, vineyards, or other manufacturers that would be
handling the shipment. While many states have some form of a limited
permitting system for shipping wine, many have a strict direct shipment
ban.34 Within these distribution schemes, the stated purpose is that states
are able to better promote certain interests, such as keeping alcohol away
from minors and facilitating proper tax collection.35
States with direct shipment bans typically utilize a three-tiered
shipment and purchasing scheme. Today, most wine is distributed through
the three-tiered system.36 The full details of this organization are discussed
later, but the basis of the rationale behind such a scheme is that it requires
29. See Jones, supra note 2, at 507-12 (discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Granholm).
30. See id. at 517-18.
31. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2000).
32. Vijay Shanker, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, The Commerce Clause, and the
Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REV. 353, 355 (1999).
33. Id
34. See Direct Shipping Map, WINE INSTITUTE, http:// wineinstitute.ship
compliant.com/Home.aspx?SaleTypelD=1 (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
35. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005).
36. FED. TRADE COMM'N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS To E-COMMERCE:
WINE 5 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Report].
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customers to follow a chain of production that is highly beneficial for the
state. The three-tiered system begins with producers, then goes through
wholesalers and distributors, and finally to retailers who pass the goods on
to the customer through retail sales.37 This system, utilized in conjunction
with direct shipping laws, has three forms. First, the reciprocal form allows
the shipment of alcohol from states that afford the same privilege to the
shipping state. Second, the limited form allows states to regulate to some
degree the shipment of alcohol, but not to entirely outlaw it." Third, the
prohibited form expressly outlaws the direct shipment of alcohol into the
state.40
While not all wineries will be affected, smaller wineries have a
greater chance of being harmed by the CARE Act and by shipping bans in
general. Large wineries have a broad base and are carried by wholesalers
across the nation for distribution to thousands of retail stores.4 1 However,
smaller wineries may not be able to brand themselves sufficiently in order
to be made widely available for sale, especially in large markets.42 They
are frustrated that their small businesses are essentially shut out by not
being carried by wholesalers, preventing their sale to other outlets in many
states.4 3 The only chance that many of these small wineries have to sell
their product and attract new customers is through the internet or through
visits to the vineyard.
The internet has brought a great deal of change to the system of wine
distribution because it is largely used by small wineries for sales and
promotion, along with direct shipping.44 The reasoning is that the demand
for "individualistic, hand-crafted wine" has been steadily on the rise. 45 As
small wineries have increased from 500-800 to 2,000 in the past 35 years,
online sales have similarly increased.4 6 Additionally, if a customer visits a
vineyard in one state and lives in another that bans direct shipment, he is
37. Shanker, supra note 32, at 355.
38. Direct Shipping Map, supra note 34; Shanker, supra note 32, at 356.
39. Direct Shipping Map, supra note 34; Shanker, supra note 32, at 356-57.
40. Direct Shipping Map, supra note 34; Shanker, supra note 32, at 357.
41. See generally F.A.Q., STOP H.R. 1161, http://www.stop 161.org/f-a-q-
copy.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
42. See generally id.
43. See generally id.
44. See Christopher G. Sparks, Out-of-State Wine Retailers Corked: How the
Illinois General Assembly Limits Direct Wine Shipments from Out-of-State Retailers to
Illinois Oenophiles and Why the Commerce Clause Will Not Protect Them, 30 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 481, 488 (2010).
45. FTC Report, supra note 36 at 6.
46. Id.
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not permitted to ship wine home or order it online.47 The marketing reach
of these smaller vineyards and manufacturers is very limited if they are not
permitted to use modem technology and standard practices to transcend
jurisdictional bounds.
The smaller wineries that are not picked up for distribution by
wholesalers are the ones that face the most harm. 48 Smaller wineries face
serious issues if they are not permitted to ship because they are, in essence,
prohibited from reaching an entirely new customer base if a wholesaler or a
retail liquor store does not select them for sale. 4 9 The larger wineries will
not face much harm unless a great deal of their business is online or
through certain websites that market their brands for sale and shipment.
These direct shipment bans have been deemed legal despite their obvious
impact on certain segments of the wine producing population. The issue is
whether such practices are discriminatory and if it matters in light of the
constitutional issues. An issue that may be important in the near future is if
the CARE Act of 2011 effectively limits the sales reach of these wineries
and whether this limitation is constitutional.
III. LEGAL HISTORY
In order to connect the details of the United States wine industry to
the overall topic of the CARE Act, the full legal issues surrounding this
topic must be unraveled. Both the United States Constitution and the
United States Supreme Court, through case law, detail the development of
alcohol regulation within the United States. Acknowledging the legal
attention paid to alcohol and alcohol regulation is imperative for the full
discussion of the possible legal effects of the Act.
A. Constitutional Provisions
1. General Constitutional Overview
Virtually any product or initiative surrounding the wine industry tends
to be very lucrative. However, along with these immense riches on one
side, serious regulatory concerns come from the other. The legal
framework is such that in modem times the states have very broad
regulatory powers over alcohol within their borders. The concept of the
47. Dana Nigro, Shipping Laws State-by-State, WINE SPECTATOR (Aug. 12, 2005),
http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/Shipping-Laws-State-by-
State 1049.
48. Eng, supra note 22, at 1881.
49. See Marcia Yablon, The Prohibition Hangover: Why We Are Still Feeling the
Effects of Prohibition, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 552, 588 (2006).
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interrelation between the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first
Amendment can be very confusing and requires due analysis. This issue
has been debated since the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment,
which resulted in this predicament of having two almost competing
concepts in the Constitution.
Most items in interstate commerce fall within the commerce power of
the federal government under the Commerce Clause, as Congress has the
power and authority to "regulate Commerce ... among the several
states."50  The laws of the several states may not be purposefully
discriminatory against each other in interstate commerce. 5 ' Through a
wide array of cases, it can be seen that alcohol has attained a special place
52within commerce through lengthy court and legislative developments.
Under the Twenty-first Amendment, wine and other alcohol are treated
much differently than normal items in commerce because it granted states
enhanced regulatory powers over alcohol. Therefore, the processes
involving the production, advertisement, shipping, and overall sale of wine
and other alcohol throughout the states originally fell within the powers of
the states because of the Twenty-first Amendment.5 4 The history following
the enactment of the Twenty-first Amendment is as varied as the history
before it and thus, jurisprudential and legislative trends have been all over
the board in terms of interpretation.s So long as the regulations
promulgated by the states meet one of the core concerns of the Twenty-first
Amendment - such as the inherently vague term of "temperance" - then
the statute could potentially be saved by the Amendment.56 Temperance,
though used to mean many things, has been cited by the Court as
"oftentimes mistaken as a synonym for 'abstinence,'" but defined as
"moderation in or abstinence from the use of intoxicating drink."57 The
law at issue must also not serve as a "pretext for mere protectionism."58
However, if the law is exclusionary or unduly discriminatory, it may be
50. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
51. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
52. See Quigley, supra note 8, at 1875-81.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (Section 2 provides that "[t]he transportation or
importation into any State ... for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof [of the state], is hereby prohibited.").
54. See Lauzon, supra note 3, at § 2[a].
55. For a more detailed, yet succinct, analysis of the case law and legislation behind
the development of Twenty-First Amendment policy, see Quigley, supra note 8, at
1878-80.
56. See Lauzon, supra note 3, at § 7.
57. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 491 (1996) (citing S&S
Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729, 733-4 (1985)).
58. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 2002).
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held invalid under the purview of the commerce power of the federal
government.
2. Introduction into Constitutional Provisions
Throughout history, wine has been both celebrated and shunned.
Wine's existence, creation, and distribution have been heavily regulated
through amendments, laws, and various social movements. Alcohol
regulation is uniquely important as "[n]o other commodity has been the
focus of not one, but two, constitutional amendments that have been
ratified in the past 100 years" for the purpose of regulation within the
American societal and economic scheme. 60 The Eighteenth and Twenty-
first Amendments, along with many pieces of legislation, are responsible
for regulating alcohol within the several states.6 1 Since the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of wine oftentimes is interstate, and because
"[i]ntoxicating liquor occupies a unique position among items of
commerce" 62 because of the Twenty-first Amendment, the provisions of the
Commerce Clause are necessary to consider as well. However, an overlap
of potential power occurs between the Twenty-first Amendment and the
federal government's commerce power under the Commerce Clause. This
is because the states have been given authority to regulate alcohol under the
Twenty-first Amendment, but the federal government retains the power
under the Commerce Clause to prevent discriminatory measures from
occurring in commerce among the several states.
3. Social and Political History
During the 1880's, some regulation of alcohol was left to the powers
of state and local governments. 6' A debate between the United States
Supreme Court and the states arose over whether the state powers or the
federal powers controlled the shipment and other aspects of intoxicating
liquors. In 1888, the Court held that states could only regulate alcohol in
61their borders after transportation has terminated. Subsequently, in the
59. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2003).
60. Grey, supra note 13, at 145 (citing Alan E. Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, Legislative
Action and Market Responses: Results of Virginia's Natural Experiment with Direct
Wine Shipment, MERCATUS (Dec. 2005), http://www.mercatus.org/repository/docLib
/MC RSPRP-DirectWineShipment 051224.pdf).
61. See Lauzon, supra note 2, at § 2[a].
62. See id
63. See Matthew J. Patterson, A Brewing Debate: Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws
and the Twenty-First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 761, 766 (2002).
64. See id.
65. Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465, 499 (1888).
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1890 Leisy v. Hardin decision, alcohol remained known as an article of
interstate commerce when the Court held that the state lacked authority to
regulate alcohol that remained in its original package.66 In discussing the
potential ramifications if the purview of the states in alcohol regulation
were lessened, Justice Gray hypothesized in his dissent that the unrestricted
use of alcohol could "produce idleness, disorder, disease, pauperism, and
crime."67 Additionally, he stated that "[t]he power of regulating or
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of [alcohol] appropriately
belongs. . .to the legislatures of the several states and can be judiciously
and effectively exercised by them alone." 68
However, some reprieve for those promoting the heightened state
regulation of alcohol was granted with the 1890 enactment of the Wilson
Act.69 The Wilson Act sought to close a loophole created by the Leisy
decision.70 Pursuant to the Wilson Act, "liquor shipped into a state could
be treated by that state in the same manner as locally produced liquor -
without regard to whether the imported liquor remained in its original
package." 7 1 While the Wilson Act enabled the states to regulate liquor
within their own borders, it did not allow the states to discriminate against
out-of-state liquor distributors, manufacturers, and sellers.72
A problem arose after the enactment of the Wilson Act, that being
distributors circumvented the dry laws of certain states by directly shipping
alcohol within the borders of such states.73 In Rhodes v. Iowa, the Court
dealt with the issue of mail-order liquor and held that the state's regulations
were not applicable to mail-order liquor.74 This decision showed that, at
the time, the direct shipping laws in the dry states could be avoided to some
extent.75 In response to all of the appeals from various states and in the
face of confusion about the regulation of alcohol, the Webb-Kenyon Act,
passed in 1913,76 permitted states to "regulate domestic and imported
liquor on equal terms."77 The Webb-Kenyon Act has been described by the
Court as "incorporat[ing] state prohibitions into a federal rule . .. clos[ing]
66. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1890).
67. Id. at 159.
68. Id
69. Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C. 121 (2010).
70. See id (removing the Leisy original packaging exception).
71. Patterson, supra note 63, at 767; see also Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2010).
72. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 461 (2005) (citing Scott v. Donald, 165
U.S. 58 (1897)).
73. See Patterson, supra note 63 at 767.
74. See Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412,426 (1898).
75. See Patterson, supra note 63 at 767.
76. Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2010).
77. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 483; Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2010).
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the loophole left by the [D]ormant [Co]mmerce [C]lause," and that the
Dormant Commerce Clause may not be used to protect liquor from
regulation.
Prohibition began in 1919 when the Eighteenth Amendment was
passed, which stated that the importation or exportation of intoxicating
liquors within the United States and all territories subject to this jurisdiction
was prohibited. 79 The Eighteenth Amendment temporarily ended state
control over the regulation of liquor and ended the movement towards local
regulation of alcohol for a while.80 The Amendment prohibited the
manufacture, sale, and transport of alcohol within the states." Thus, this
period was aptly named "Prohibition." Before Prohibition, the states had
flexibility to make their own decisions in terms of liquor regulation without
regard for the Commerce Clause, but they were unable to "enact alcohol
regulations that ran counter to prohibition."82
In 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment was passed, which placed an
end to Prohibition and stated that such transportation or importation is
prohibited when in violation of state laws.83 The Twenty-first Amendment
reads as follows:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it
shall have been ratified as an amendment to the
Constitution by conventions in the several States, as
provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the
78. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000) (J.
Easterbrook explaining the effect of the Webb-Kenyon Act on the Twenty-First
Amendment and on alcohol regulation in general).
79. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIHI § 1.
80. See Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control over
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161, 165
(1991).
81. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII § 1.
82. Patterson, supra note 63, at 769; see also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377,
381 (1992).
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
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date of the submission hereof to the State by the
84
Congress.
By reason of the enactment of the Twenty-first Amendment, the states were
left untouched by the traditional commerce powers and are given broad
regulatory power to control the import and export of alcohol within their
borders.85 Because of the prohibition of the transportation and importation
of alcohol into the states in violation of each state's individual laws, the
Twenty-first Amendment has generated debate over the power of the states
to regulate.86 If a state law is found to be in violation of the Commerce
Clause, a determination may be made on whether it can be saved as long as
a core concern of the Twenty-first Amendment is found as its purpose. 87
A debate about the Twenty-first Amendment has taken place since its
enactment. Some argue that the Amendment grants too much power to the
states to regulate alcohol.88 Additionally, the Amendment is seen as a grant
to states that authorizes them to regulate alcohol exclusive of some
important interstate commerce issues.89 Proponents argue that, among
other issues, the Amendment is a conditional grant of power that is to be
used when core concerns such as temperance and preventing minors from
drinking are at issue.90
B. Judicial Pronouncements
1. Development of the Court Doctrine
The courts were faced with the difficult job of interpreting all of these
statutes and Amendments. While a rich history exists, the cases most
implicitly related to the topic of this paper involve a standard of modern
accommodation. After the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment, a great
deal of legal controversy faced the Court. In 1936, the Court ruled in State
Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Company that a difference in
enforcement of import fees between imported beer and domestic beer was
allowable and saved from the regulation of the Commerce Clause by the
84. Id.
85. See Lauzon, supra note 3, at§ 2[a].
86. See Spaeth, supra note 80, at 180-81.
87. See Lauzon, supra note 3, at § 2[a].
88. See State Bd. Of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936); see
also Patterson, supra note 63, at 771.
89. See State Bd. OfEqualization, 299 U.S. at 62; see also Patterson, supra note 63,
at 771.
90. See Bridenbaugh v. O'Bannon, 78 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (N.D. Ind. 1999); see
also Patterson, supra note 51 at 771.
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Twenty-first Amendment.9 In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp., the Court made a point in stating that if the commodity in question
were anything other than liquor, such as lumber or grain, then the
Commerce Clause would disallow these practices.92 Additionally, the
Idlewild case marked an ideological shift in the liquor regulation debate.
The Court held that the concept of the Twenty-first Amendment repealing
the Commerce Clause as applied to liquor was "patently bizarre" and
incorrect.9 3Additionally, the two provisions - the Commerce Clause and
the Twenty-first Amendment - must be considered in light of one
another.9 4
In 1980, years after the Idlewild decision, the Court held that while a
state had substantial discretion to create regulations for liquor, the controls
used "may be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate
situations" and competing interests may be reconciled only after scrutiny of
concerns. 95  In keeping with this trend, the Court found an alcoholic
beverage price-posting law in California to be invalid and subsequently
struck it down.9 6 This allowed for distributors to compete on price and
therefore caused drastic consolidation among the smaller wineries.97 The
ruling not only caused more concentration for distribution systems and
more competition, but it also did so in national retail systems, with a
decrease in the number of available outlets.98  Thus, the debate over
distribution and retail of wine among the states began anew. States had
broad regulatory powers over liquor under the Twenty-first Amendment,
but such power still did not necessarily allow the arbitrary and unfair
setting of regulations.
In interpreting the previous cases, the Court in the First Amendment
case of Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp held that the issue in alcohol related
cases is whether the interests of state regulations are "so closely related to
the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation
may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with
express federal policies." 99 Finally, the result in Bacchus Imports, Ltd v.
Dias was that the Twenty-first Amendment could not be used as a pretext
91. See 299 U.S. 59, 60-62 (1936).
92. 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964).
93. Id. at 331-2.
94. Id. at 332.
95. California Retail Liquors Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
110 (1980).
96. See id. at 114.
97. Riekhof and Sykuta, supra note 15, at 31.
98. See generally id.
99. 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984).
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for mere protectionism and that it should not "empower states to favor local
liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition." 00 The Bacchus
Court moved away from the accommodation principle when it considered
the principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment.10 ' The move was
between the modem accommodation test and the core concerns test. The
line of post-Bacchus cases has led to a "core concerns" test that makes
certain that the law meets a "core concern" of the Twenty-first
Amendment, most notably, temperance.1 02
2. The Granholm Decision
A change arose after the decision in Granholm v. Heald where the
Court was faced with the important issue of whether a state can treat out-
of-state wineries differently than it treats those located within its borders
for determining whether the winery can ship to the state's residents. The
issue in the case "deal[t] with the lengthy jurisprudence on the effect
Section Two of the Twenty-first Amendment has on the anti-discriminatory
mandate of the Commerce Clause."'0 3 The Court held that the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the states broad power, but that it does not allow them to
completely circumvent the Commerce Clause.'0 The Court then attempted
to reconcile the differences between the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-
first Amendment by acknowledging that, while the Twenty-first
Amendment grants power to the states, such power does not necessarily
overcome the need for fair commerce and "does not allow the states to ban,
or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while
simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers." 05
Additionally, the Twenty-first Amendment does not automatically take
precedence over the Commerce Clause, rather, the two must be considered
in light of each other. Therefore, statutes of the various states may not treat
in-state wineries preferentially when such treatment is not given to
competitors from out of state. 10 6
Justice Kennedy, in speaking for the Granholm court, held that "[t]he
differential treatment between in-state and out-of-state wineries constitutes
explicit discrimination"'0 7 that is "neither authorized nor permitted by the
100. 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
101. See id. at 275-77.
102. See Shanker, supra note 32, at 375-6.
103. Sparks, supra note 44, at 491.
104. See id. at 482; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005).
105. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 461, 467.
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Twenty-first Amendment."108 Additionally, state laws concerning alcohol
regulation pursuant to the authority granted by the Twenty-first
Amendment "must still pass judicial scrutiny under the anti-discrimination
mandate of the [D]ormant Commerce Clause." 109  States may not
"indiscriminately abrogate the direct shipment abilities of in-state and out-
of-state wineries." 110 While the majority of the opinion deals with the fair
enforcement laws, it is important to note that the Granholm decision serves
as a limitation on the power of states to make their own laws regarding
alcohol. In essence, Granholm gives states authority to regulate alcohol,
but it does not give them the power to sidestep the Commerce Clause and
erect protectionist barriers.1 '
IV. THE CARE ACTS -H.R. 5034 AND H.R. 1161
A. The Predecessor ofH.R. 1161 - H.R. 5034
The CARE Acts, in either form, may serve to shake the strength of the
Granholm ruling to its core. The relevant text of H.R. 5034 is located
within the purpose statement in section two and the support for state
alcohol regulation in section three. The purpose of the CARE Act is to "(1)
recognize that alcohol is different from other consumer products and that it
should be regulated effectively by the States according to the laws thereof;
and (2) reaffirm and protect the primary authority of State to regulate
alcoholic beverages."ll 2 Additionally, the Webb-Kenyon Act would be
amended by H.R. 5034 by adding the following text:
(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is the policy of
Congress that each State or territory shall continue to have
the primary authority to regulate alcoholic beverages.
(b) CONSTRUCTION OF CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE. -
Silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to
impose any barrier under clause 3 of section 8 of article I
of the Constitution (commonly referred to as the
'Commerce Clause') to the regulation by a State or
territory of alcoholic beverages. However, State or
territorial regulations may not facially discriminate,
without justification, against out-of-state producers of
alcoholic beverages in favor of in-state producers.
108. Id. at 466.
109. Sparks, supra note 44, at 506.
110. Id. at 507.
111. See Congress's Sour Grapes, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 27, 2011, at A16.
112. H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
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(c) PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND BURDEN OF
PROOF. - The following shall apply in any legal action
challenging, under the Commerce Clause or an Act of
Congress, a State or territory law regarding the regulation
of alcoholic beverages:
(1) The State or territorial law shall be accorded a
strong presumption of validity.
(2) The party challenging the State or territorial law
shall in all places of any such legal action bear the burden
of proving its invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.
(3) Notwithstanding that the State or territorial law
may burden interstate commerce or may be inconsistent
with an Act of the Congress, the State law shall be upheld
unless the party challenging the State or territorial law
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the law
has no effect on the promotion of temperance, the
establishment or maintenance of orderly alcoholic
beverage markets, the collection of alcoholic beverage
taxes, the structure of the state alcoholic beverage
distribution system, or the restriction of access to alcoholic
beverages by those under the legal drinking age.113
H.R. 5034 was introduced to the Second Session of the 111th
Congress on April 15, 2010 and was referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary and then to the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy,
which began hearings on September 29, 1010.114 During these committee
hearings, various Members of Congress and other interested parties
discussed the bill to provide information on the future action that will be
taken concerning the bill by supporters and opponents.'15  Arguments
flared throughout the debate, yet the bill ultimately never made it out of the
House, hence H.R. 1161.116
An issue that has received attention regarding this bill is something
that is age old in politics - purchasing votes. According to one report, $1.3
113. Id. at § 3.
114. Bill Summary & Status - H.R. 5034, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?dl 11 :HR05034:@@@L&summ2=m& (last
visited Feb. 25, 2012).
115. See Robert Taylor, Congress Holds Hearing on Bill Threatening Wine Direct
Shipping, WINE SPECTATOR (Sept. 30, 2010), http:www.winespectator.com/webfeature/
show/id/43670.
116. Michael D. LaFaive, Beer and Wine Wholesalers Deliver Themselves
Regulatory Privileges, MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY (July 20, 2011),
https://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=1 5434&print=yes.
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million was paid to members of Congress supporting H.R. 5034 and at least
32 members were given contributions from wholesalers of alcohol within
months of signing their names to the legislation.'17 The Wine and Spirits
Wholesalers of America and the lawmakers involved stated that no
wrongdoing occurred."'8  However, the Distilled Spirits Council of the
United States (DISCUS), which opposed the bill, felt that the money
resulting from sponsorships was only to benefit the wholesalers and
disadvantage the smaller distilleries and wineries.'' 9
B. The New CARE Act - H.R. 1161
On March 17, 2011, The Community Alcohol Regulatory
Effectiveness Act of 2011 was introduced to the 112th Congress.120 Most
of the language between H.R. 5034 and H.R. 1161 is nearly identical and
the purpose behind the bills are the exact same.121 While the language is
mostly the same, some has changed in the new version and is noted in
italics below:
(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is the policy of
Congress to recognize and reaffirm that alcohol is
different from other consumer products and that it should
continue to be regulated by the States.
(b) CONSTRUCTION OF CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE. -
Silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to
impose any barrier under clause 3 of section 8 of article I
of the Constitution (commonly referred to as the
'Commerce Clause') to the regulation by a State or
territory of alcoholic beverages. However, State or
territorial regulations may not intentionally or facially
discriminate against out-of-State or out-of-territory
producers of alcoholic beverages in favor of in-State or in-
territory producers unless the State or territory can
demonstrate that the challenged law advances a legitimate




120. H.R. 1161,I12thCong. (2011).
121. Lindsey A. Zahn, H.R. 5034 is Now H.R. 1161, ON RESERVE: A WINE LAW
BLOG (Mar. 20, 2011), www.winelawonreserve.com/2011/03/20/h-r-5034-is-now-h-r-
1161/.
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local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. 22
H.R. 1161, while keeping most of the same language as the previous
bill, adds to and subtracts from some very important places. First, the
declaration of policy section is completely restated from the original
version and provides more pointed language. In section (b), the language
"without justification" was removed from the original bill, which was
likely a concession that had to be made to gain supporters. Additionally,
language was added in section (b) that grants more authority to the states,
likely since the "without justification" language was removed. Now, states
must merely show that their legitimate local purpose cannot be
accomplished by nondiscriminatory alternatives in order for discriminatory
legislation to be allowed. This is overly broad, as nearly anything could be
construed as valid under this language.
C. Purpose of the CARE Act
H.R. 5034 was meant to support the alcohol regulation programs of
the states and to ensure that, among other things, alcohol taxes would be
collected.123 The listed purpose was to first "recognize that alcohol is
different from other consumer products and that it should be regulated
effectively by the States according to the laws thereof' and secondly to
"reaffirm and protect the primary authority of States to regulate alcoholic
beverages."1 2 4 Some of the language was seemingly in line with what was
already in place. Namely, the recent history of the regulation of alcohol
has shown that regulatory control has returned to the states so long as the
Twenty-first Amendment goals are not violated and the Commerce Clause
is not hampered unjustly. So, if the purpose of the bill is to give power to
the states that they already have, what is the problem?
The main issue with H.R. 5034 came in the section that outlines the
support for state alcohol regulation. The bill states that Congressional
silence should not be used as an imposition of a barrier under the
Commerce Clause but that state regulations "may not facially discriminate,
without justification, against out-of-state producers of alcoholic beverages
in favor of in-state producers."1 2 5 H.R. 5034 expands the power of the
states to the extent that the challenging party carries the burden of proving
that the state law is not within the purview of the Twenty-first Amendment,
122. Compare HR 1161 at § 3 with H.R. 5034.
123. H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. (2010).
124. Id. at §2.
125. Id. at § 3(b).
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but rather within the power of Congress' commerce power.126 The issue
with the language of "without justification" is that it could possibly place
too "high [a] burden of proof on any legal challenge to a state's distribution
laws" since it requires clear and convincing evidence.127 Many in
opposition worry that the addition of the "without justification" language
implies that discrimination is permissible so long as those enacting the law
can provide some faint sense of justification.
H.R. 1161 has identical motives and purposes, despite the slight
changes in language between the two bills. Concerning the introduction of
H.R. 1161, Congressman Mike Thompson stated that "[t]he federal
government has no business picking winners and losers in the wine, beer,
and distilled spirits industry. Yet the Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory
Effectiveness Act would do just that by banning the direct shipment of
wine and other forms of alcohol in the U.S."1 28 Additionally, Thompson
opined that the impact of the CARE Act "would be devastating for brewers,
vintners, distillers, importers, and consumers across our country"
particularly because it "would allow states to replace federal standards with
their own, making it harder for out-of-state producers in California and
elsewhere to comply with other states' laws."l29
D. Possible Effects of the CARE Act on State Regulation ofAlcohol
All states in some way or another regulate the importation and
distribution of alcohol. 130 The Federal Trade Commission has stated that
"[s]tate bans on interstate direct shipping represent the single largest
126. Id. at § 3(c).
127. Dave McIntyre, Bill in Congress would undo Va. vinter's victory over wine
shipping, WASHINGTON POST, (May 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2010/05/04/ST2010050403163.html. See also H.R. 5034, 111th
Cong. § 3(c) (2010) (The text of H.R. 5034 states that "[n]otwithstanding that the State
or territorial law may burden interstate commerce or may be inconsistent with an Act of
Congress, the State law shall be upheld unless the party challenging the State or
territorial law establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the law has no effect
on the promotion of temperance, the establishment or maintenance of orderly alcoholic
beverage markets, the collection of alcoholic beverage taxes, the structure of the state
alcoholic beverage distribution system, or the restriction of access to alcoholic
beverages by those under the legal drinking age.").
128. Zahn, supra note 121.
129. Id.
130. Anne Faircloth, Mail-order Wine Buyers, Beware!, FORTUNE, 46 (Feb. 15,
1998).
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regulatory barrier to expanded e-commerce in wine." 3 1  Direct wine
shipping would help in getting wine out to as many persons as possible and
thus would help stimulate the U.S. economy. However, with the possibility
of the passage of H.R. 1161, many groups of wine lovers and winemakers
are worried that their ability to ship will be even further stifled. The states
will potentially be able to pass facially discriminatory laws if they can
justify that the law has an effect on the promotion of temperance, or other
core Twenty-first Amendment objectives. 132  However, whether it is
temperance or an attempt to safeguard children from the dangers of
alcohol, citizens of many states are not able to participate in the direct
shipment of wine. Generally, states that do not participate in direct wine
shipping are proponents of a three-tiered system of distribution.13
Through the three-tiered distribution system allowed by the Twenty-
first Amendment, the Court enumerates these tiers as follows: in tier one
are alcohol producers, tier two are wholesalers, and tier three are
retailers. 13 4 The three-tiered system creates barriers between the different
segments of the production, distribution, and retail portions of the alcohol
business.' Tier one alcohol producers are permitted to sell products to
licensed tier two wholesalers who may, in turn, sell to licensed tier three
retailers in the state. 13 6 The wholesalers provide information about the
producers and the alcohol that is imported as well as collect excise taxes
from them.13 7 Wholesalers then sell to licensed retailers within the state for
profit by charging higher prices than they paid to the suppliers. 13 8 The
retailers in a strict three-tier system are the tier that directly interacts with
the individual customers. 139 The alcohol must pass through the wholesaler
and the retailer, both collecting profits along the way, before it can reach
the customer at a higher price through an established practice of vertical
hierarchy. 140  Certain groups favor this hierarchical approach since it
131. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 468(2005) (citing Possible Anticompetitive
Barriers to E-Commerce: Wine, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 5-7 (July 2003),
available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf).
132. See F.A.Q., supra note 41; see also H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. § 3(c) (2010).
133. See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 428 (1990).
134. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466-67.
135. Aaron R. Gary, Treating All Grapes Equally: Interstate Alcohol Shipping After
Granholm, 83 Wis. LAW. 6 (Mar. 2010).
136. See id.
137. Russell A. Miller, The Wine is in the Mail: The Twenty-First Amendment and




140. See Gary, supra note 135, at 8-9.
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allegedly "facilitates efficient tax collection, aids in the enforcement of
alcohol-beverage laws such as underage drinking prohibitions, and
promotes orderly market conditions."' 4 ' However, the flip side to this
argument is that "[t]he three-tier system puts smaller producers or
suppliers, particularly start-ups, at a disadvantage by narrowing the feasibly
available distribution channels; in doing so, it limits the product selection
available to consumers." 4 2 Any laws strengthening the three-tiered system
and restricting individual distribution enhance the factors that disadvantage
smaller businesses in the alcohol industry.
Many of the state laws disallowing direct shipment protect this type
of tiered distribution system. Two ways to ship to those in states with
direct shipping bans in place include utilizing either a tiered system or
obtaining a permit through the state.143  This is difficult because the
different types of shipping laws throughout the states tend to vary greatly.
For example, an express prohibition on the direct shipment of wine entirely
eliminates the possibility of a supplier sending wine to a customer without
a permit.'" Additionally, limited direct shipping laws, which allow for
direct shipment in small quantities, are sometimes allowed. 14' Finally,
reciprocal states allow direct shipping if the state with which they direct
ship will be able to ship to said state.146
Two distinct groups have formed on each side of this long-fought
wine shipping debate. Many wineries and manufacturers run a risk of not
getting picked up by wholesalers because of their small production volume,
resulting in their not being marketed in states that ban shipping. 147 These
laws make it difficult for a winery that is starting up to market and expand
their product.148  The fact that distribution and retail markets are
consolidating means that direct shipping becomes the most efficient form
of sale. The limitations on these small wineries by the states are, in
essence, providing an obstacle "to increase[ing] volume, consumer base,
and geographic market[s].149 Another argument against the three-tiered
system and for less regulation is that the wholesale markup of the products
of smaller wineries makes their sales impractical.15 0 Additionally, these
141. Id. at 8 (citing Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489-93 (2005).
142. Id. at 8.
143. Miller, supra note 137, at 2497-98.
144. Id. at 2498.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2498.
147. Shanker, supra note 32, at 362.
148. FTC Report, supra note 36.
149. Riekhof & Sykuta, supra note 15, at 32.
150. Sparks, supra note 44, at 489.
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extra layers of passage and shipment raise the prices overall and make
many small wineries unable to sell outside of their state of production.15
Opponents of the CARE Act fear that, "if enacted by Congress, would give
states the ability to pass discriminatory wine shipping bans and other anti-
free market legislation without consequence of court challenge if the laws
are discriminatory or protectionist."' 52 The other group in this argument
believes that retailers and wholesalers have a strong interest in preventing
the direct shipment of wine, because competition is lessened and tax
collection is facilitated by the taxation of all alcohol sold to state
residents.'"
V. ANALYSIS
Taking into account the thorough history of alcohol regulation both
by Congress and the Courts, the enactment of H.R. 1161 should be treated
similarly. The same standards applied in Granholm should be applied to
the present issue. Because the Court has stated that discriminatory policies
cannot supersede the Dormant Commerce Clause under the Twenty-first
Amendment, the types of laws that could be enacted under H.R. 1161
deserve strict analysis. Because the bill states that laws cannot be
intentionally or facially discriminatory without advancing a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be reached by nondiscriminatory measures, 154 many
worry that discriminatory laws will be passed and upheld so long as some
faint sense of justification is present. This could possibly open the door
further to discriminatory practices among the states. Possibly
discriminatory laws should not be overlooked simply in deference to the
state; but a stricter review would seem to be in conflict with the purpose of
the CARE Act.
The arguments on both sides of the spectrum are strong and it appears
that little middle ground exists. For the most part, wine, beer, and liquor
wholesalers promote the enactment of H.R. 1161, as shown through their
money trail of donations.'"' It is in their best business interest for the bill to
be passed. However, many smaller wineries and manufacturers of wine
and beer, who sell a majority of their product through direct sales, bring the
counter-argument and opposition for the passage of the bill. 5 6 Under the
151. See id; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 474 (2005).
152. State Shipping Laws FAQs, supra note 25.
153. See id.
154. See H.R. 1161, 112th Cong. § 3(b) (2011).
155. See H.R. 1161 - Community Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness Act of 2011
Overview, OPEN CONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-hi161/show (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter CARE Act 2011 Overview].
156. FTC Report, supra note 36.
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bill, if a wholesaler does not choose to carry a smaller enterprise's product,
then their product will not be brought to stores across the country and,
since they would no longer be able to use the mail, then their hands will
become tied for sales.157
The largest group in favor of the adoption of the CARE Act into law
is the Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of America, a giant in sales and
distribution of wine and other alcohol throughout the country.'5 Another
group that is financially backing the adoption of the bill is the National
Beer Wholesalers Association.159 Their outward reasoning behind their
support is that they feel that court decisions against the states dismantle
regulations that "inhibit illegal sales to minors[,] ensure that all intoxicating
liquor is lawfully sold through licensed vendors[,] curb overly aggressive
marketing and consumption[,] achieve the effective collection of
taxes[,]and establish an orderly, accountable and transparent distribution
and importation system."' 60 Craig Wolf, president of the Wine & Spirits
Wholesalers of America stated that the current three-tier system is the "best
beverage alcohol distribution system in the world" and that "[i]t is
important that states retain their constitutional power to regulate the
distribution of beverage alcohol and are able to fend off litigation which
serves to destabilize or destroy that authority."' 6 ' The premise behind this
issue is further seen by the line of reasoning that "[a]lthough all Americans
are guaranteed inalienable rights such as life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, access to wine is not one of them." 6 2
Those most adamantly opposed to the adoption of H.R. 1161 consists
of groups such as the Specialty Wine Retailers Association, the National
Association of Manufacturers, Wine Institute, Wine America, the American
Wine Society, the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (DISCUS),
Free the Grapes, and many other statewide wine growing and selling
157. See generally F.A.Q, supra note 41.
158. See CARE Act 2011 Overview, supra note 155; see also About WSA, WINE &
SPIRITS WHOLESALERS OF AMERICA, http://www.wswa.org/about.php (last visited Mar.
1,2012).
159. H.R. 1161 - Community Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness Act of 2011 Money,
OPEN CONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/ 12-h 161/money (last visited
Mar. 4, 2012) [hereinafter CARE Act of 2011 Money].
160. Beer Distributor Advocacy Across the States, NATIONAL BEER WHOLESALERS
ASSOCIATION, http://nbwa.org/sites/default/files/annual-report-2010-11 .pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2012).
161. McIntyre, supra note 127.
162. Peter Sinton, No Wine Across the Line: Vinters Confront States' Shipping Laws,
S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 29, 2001, at Bl.
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organizations.163 The reasons behind their opposition range from the fact
that the bill will give the authority to state governments "to pass
discriminatory wine shipping bans and other anti-free market legislation
without consequence" to the fact that this legislation could effectively shut
down many currently-thriving and up-and-coming wineries doing their
business through direct shipment and on-site sales.164  Rep. Mike
Thompson (D, CA), one of the loudest leaders against the enactment of the
original CARE Act said "[w]ine is produced in all 50 states, including more
than 6,000 wineries: a 500 percent increase in the past 30 years, . . . [and]
[y]et the number of wine wholesalers has decreased by more than 50
percent, creating a distribution bottleneck."1 6 5 Because of the reliance and
dependence of many wineries on self-distribution and direct-to-consumer
sales, Thompson stated that a new federal law such as H.R. 5034 (and its
progeny) is not needed and that litigation will cease only "when states stop
passing discriminatory laws promoted by the wholesalers."l 66 Jeremy
Benson, executive director of Free the Grapes, stated that the CARE Act is
a threat to wineries and is important to consumers "because they see a
monopolistic special interest trying to take away their ability to choose
what wines to enjoy."167  Perhaps these loud voices, coupled with an
angered citizenry, are reaching the Members of Congress and are helping
change minds. On January 17, 2012, Representative Kurt Schrader (D-OR)
withdrew his co-sponsorship of H.R. 1161 and stated that after he spoke
with Oregon wine growers, enthusiasts, and the rest of the wine
community, he "no longer believe[s] the CARE Act is an appropriate
vehicle for regulation of alcohol" and "look[s] forward to building on the
relationship we have developed to further grow the success of Oregon's
wine industry." 68
Despite the arguments of those in favor of the passage of the CARE
Act, it is a real possibility the bill could put many small wineries and
distilleries out of business. As the title of this article states, H.R. 1161
would effectively "put a cork" in winery sales for many across the country
and in their abilities to further their brand and product line through avenues
163. CARE Act 2011 Overview, supra note 155. Similar groups also opposed H.R.
5034. See Who opposes H.R. 1161?, STOP H.R. 1161, http://www.stopl 161.org/
schedule.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2010).
164. F.A.Q., supra note 41.
165. McIntyre, supra note 127.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. News Release, Congressman Kurt Schrader, Schrader withdraws co-sponsorship
of H.R. 1161: Community Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness (CARE) Act of 2011 (Jan.
17, 2012), available at http://schrader.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=24&itemid=488.
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such as the internet. While it is true that the wholesalers make a case for
the fact that laws concerning alcohol should be made and protected by the
state legislatures and not by judges, the states already have a sweeping
amount of this type of protection under the purview of the Twenty-first
Amendment. With the current status of laws controlling alcohol regulation
and of the constitutional protections of state regulation, there is no need to
reaffirm and grant more power to the states. A delicate balance has been
struck since the enactment of the Twenty-first Amendment to place it in
harmony with the Commerce Clause. This balance, while a bit rocky at
times, was given further meaning after the Granholm decision. This bill, if
passed, could have the potential to nullify some of the important effects of
the Granholm decision.
With the passage of H.R. 1161, the states would have more sweeping
powers to adopt laws that are discriminatory through methods of
justification concerning wine sales and shipping.
As long as the state can show that their law banning shipment
"advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives" and that the intent to
discriminate was not present, then the Commerce Clause could possibly be
nudged to the side.169 Should the Twenty-first Amendment be used to save
blatantly discriminatory laws from the reach of the Commerce Clause? It
is doubtful that this is the proper way to utilize the Twenty-first
Amendment within this day and age. Times have changed and with the
various abilities of the state to protect the core concerns of the Twenty-first
Amendment, aside from direct shipping bans, no real reason is present for
laws that ban shipping alcohol. The Supreme Court has spoken on the
matter to some extent and ruled that "the Twenty-first Amendment does not
immunize all laws from Commerce Clause challenge.',170 Additionally, the
Court held that the list of "Commerce Clause cases demand more than
mere speculation to support discrimination against out of state goods." 7 1
Through the Supreme Court's analysis of what "more than mere
speculation" would include, it appears that this burden is fairly high, as it
was not met in Granholm.172
Another issue within this general argument is that the Twenty-first
Amendment's goal of temperance is sometimes misused to mask a practice
of economic protectionism. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., a case
concerning laws directing the packing and storage facilities of cantaloupes,
the Court held that state laws are subject to certain criteria when they affect
169. H.R. 1161, I12th Cong. § 3(b) (2011).
170. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488 (2005).
171. Id.at492.
172. Id. at 490-92.
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interstate commerce and that such laws will be upheld "unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits."' 7 3 To even be subjected to this test and not immediately
considered unduly discriminatory, the law must regulate "even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce [must be] only incidental."l 74 Additionally, if a legitimate local
purpose is found underneath the law then the court weighs the degree. 75
Then, "the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
,,176promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
The economy of the United States is one of an integrated nature; to
simply state that laws concerning certain articles of commerce are not
subject to this same standard of immunity is perhaps misplaced and
incorrect. Congress regulates wine, a legal item in commerce, far
differently and more vigorously and intrusively than it regulates cheese. 77
If the goal of the laws of all of the states is simply to engage in economic
protectionism and not to fulfill one of the goals of the Twenty-first
Amendment, then the statute should be subject to a harsher review.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order for the states to be able to regulate alcohol, they must be
engaging in the activity of protecting a "core concern" of the Twenty-first
Amendment. However, since the modem "core concern" balancing test
can be extended fairly far in favor of invoking the protection of the state
law by the Twenty-first Amendment, it is likely that H.R. 1161 will only
further enhance that power. Since direct shipment is already banned in
many states without H.R. 1161, it is quite possible that more laws of this
nature will be put into place. It is also possible that laws even more
detrimental to small wineries and individual oenophiles will be enacted.
With the text of the CARE Act, it appears that so long as state laws are not
intentionally or facially discriminatory and can show some semblance of a
legitimate local purpose, the law would be upheld by the Act.
Thus, because of the CARE Act, it is assumed that more
discriminatory legislation will be sustained than before. The probable
effect of this legislation will be lost revenue for many wineries and
173. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 142.
176. Id.
177. See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2000).
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distilleries throughout this country, likely those that are small or just
starting, which will ultimately result in shut downs and a severe business
downturn. This also lessens the amount of money going into the overall
alcohol related economy, as individuals in states with direct shipment bans
will not be able to order alcohol for shipment at all. It seems counter-
intuitive for the economic prospects of the country that Congress may favor
a provision that has the potential to cause great financial downfall for
hardworking Americans in the wine industry simply to fatten the pockets of
H.R. 1161 -supporting Members of Congress and of the richest lobbyists for
the wineries and wholesalers.
The issue is clearly one of great divide. The recent decisions of the
Supreme Court show that the balance cannot solely be shifted towards
protection of state interests. The federal government has both a right and
an obligation to make sure that fair dealings are occurring throughout the
nation concerning commerce. The Court has often alluded to the fact that
wine and other forms of alcohol are treated in a certain way simply because
of their nature. This is a very antiquated notion and it could very well be
time for the court and the nation to review the need for any special
treatment of alcohol. While this notion is a different debate in itself, it is
important to note that the times have changed and the days of Prohibition
are long gone. The sentiment within segments of the population that
alcohol is inherently evil is very misplaced, at least in terms of the
regulation of interstate commerce. Any good placed into commerce can be
manipulated and used in such a way that would be harmful for someone in
society. It is unlikely that Congress would ever give the states authority to
regulate other legal products like they do with wine.' 78  Therefore, the
misplaced protectionist views of wine could be considered by many to be
unfair and unduly burdensome.
States have broad power as it stands, and the reality is that if the
CARE Act is enacted into law, more unjustified and unrestricted restraint
on free trade could occur. States being able to provide faulty and scant
justifications for their discrimination is beyond the scope of what the
Twenty-first Amendment should protect. A risk of enhancement of
economic protectionism is also present. The bill does not define what
would be included in the umbrella of valid justification for discriminatory
laws and what could be considered to "advance[e] a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
178. Congress's Sour Grapes, supra note I11 ("It's hard to imagine Congress giving
states the authority to prohibit Amazon or any other online retailer from shipping its
products directly to consumers. Yet that's exactly what they're trying to do with wine.
Sounds to us like a case of sour grapes that deserves to be stomped.").
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alternatives." 79 While not all discrimination is bad and punishable, much
of it is, and discriminatory laws should exist only when certain reasons are
present. The original CARE Act, H.R. 5034, read that laws would be
unconstitutional unless they worked towards "the promotion of temperance,
the establishment or maintenance of orderly alcoholic beverage markets,
the collection of alcoholic beverage taxes, the structure of the state
alcoholic beverage distribution system, or the restriction of access to
alcoholic beverages by those under the legal drinking age., 180 However,
the drafters of H.R. 1161 have eliminated this section from the bill."' The
Supreme Court has provided states with guidance that when states regulate
even-handedly, advance a legitimate local public interest and the
regulation's "effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits."' 82 The drafters of the laws that
effectively act to shut down wineries throughout the nation may be hard-
pressed to be able to show that the effect on commerce is merely incidental.
The supporters of H.R. 1161 are in their position solely because of
the colossal amounts of money involved, nothing more, nothing less. They
have a great deal of money to gain through the exclusion of smaller
wineries from the nationwide market and have spent hundreds of thousands
of dollars just in garnering support for their position within Congress.1 83
By forcing citizens of states with direct shipping laws to go through the
traditional three-tiered regulatory scheme, the perpetuation of
discriminatory practices is furthered. However, the main problem is what
this bill ultimately seeks to do-make it virtually impossible to challenge
discriminatory laws in court. At its core, H.R. 1161 is merely a piece of
special interest legislation that limits free trade, competition, consumerism,
and diminishes an industry at the heart of American commerce that has
permeated the boundaries of all fifty states. Congress is attempting to
circumvent the Court's authority in determining the constitutionality of
alcohol related laws. The big wholesalers are bullying the small wineries
and wine producers by trying to have as many states as possible impose
179. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005); H.R. 1161, 112th Cong. §
(3)(c)(3) (2011).
180. H.R. 5034, 111th Cong. § 3(c)(3) (2010).
181. Compare H.R. 1161 with H.R. 5034.
182. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (The Court further stated
that "[i]f a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature
of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.").
183. See CARE Act of 2011 Money, supra note 159.
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direct shipment bans. This type of legislation would keep the strict three-
tiered regulatory system firmly in place and money firmly in the pockets of
the wholesale giants.
Plus, in the end, what oenophile doesn't get frustrated when they
can't order their favorite wine that their local store does not carry?
Requiring that a state merely show that their law advances some subjective
legitimate local purpose that cannot be served by other means is possibly
too minimal of a floor to set. While a few major super-wholesalers and
others of the sort adamantly support the adoption of H.R. 1161, the
majority of the American wine-drinking public will be outraged that
someone is trying to halt their ability to purchase wine for shipment to their
home. Those whose livelihood will be affected, namely small wineries and
manufactures, will also be outraged. The potential grant of power to the
states by H.R. 1161 to discriminate in regulation with only a scant amount
of justification is directly in conflict with the principles for which this
country stands. Ultimately, the heart of this argument is that no
discriminatory practices should be tolerated under the Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment should not be twisted for use in
such an abusive way. Direct shipment bans are, by their nature,
discriminatory against an entire subset of completely legal products.
Allowing states to pass laws that further discriminate against a subset of
goods within the economy is wholly unjust. H.R. 1161 should not be
permitted to "put a cork" in the availability of an alcohol manufacturer's
cause of action in the courts and should not be able to eliminate important
protections granted by the Commerce Clause.1 84
184. See Congress's Sour Grapes, supra note 111.
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